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Abstract
We consider the one-to-one two-sided matching with contracts model in which
buyers face financial constraints. In this model there is a stable outcome, but not
necessarily a competitive equilibrium as defined in the standard way. We propose a
new equilibrium notion, quantity-constrained competitive equilibrium (QCCE) that
allows buyers to form rational expectations on the lack of supply when their financial
constraints are binding. We show the existence of QCCEs and establish the equiva-
lence among QCCE outcomes, stable outcomes, and core outcomes. We also analyze
the existence of QCCEs with uniform prices, the lattice property of QCCEs, and the
rural hospital theorem of QCCEs. We finally examine the relation between models
with financial constraints and models with price controls.
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1 Introduction
Standard models in matching and auction theory assume that agents face no financial
constraints, i.e., they have neither liquidity nor credit constraints. However, financial con-
straints arise commonly, in a variety of situations, for example, in privatization processes in
developing countries, in the spectrum licence auctions in European countries, and mergers
and acquisitions amongst corporations.1
The analysis of models with financial constraints is qualitatively different from that
of models without financial constraints.2 Financial constraints evidently influence agents’
trading behaviors and shrink the number of potential transactions. Moreover, financial
constraints may result in the lack of existence of competitive equilibria (Talman and Yang,
2015; van der Laan and Yang, 2016). In this paper, we argue that the standard definition
of competitive equilibrium should be adjusted.
We study the one-to-one two-sided matching with contracts model in the spirit of
Crawford and Knoer (1981), Roth (1984), and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) in the presence
of financial constraints. Buyers and sellers have the possibility to choose from a finite set
of possible trades. Each trade is bilateral and designates its buyer and seller. A contract
consists of a trade and a financial payment from the buyer to the seller for that trade. We
allow that the payment changes continuously, so the set of contracts is infinite.
The utility functions of buyers and sellers are defined on the set of contracts. Utility
functions satisfy standard continuity and monotonicity assumptions and need not be quasi-
linear. We introduce financial constraints on the buyers side. Any contract violating these
constraints is not feasible. Our modeling of financial constraints is sufficiently general
to allow for absence of such constraints as a special case and to allow constraints to be
trade-dependent. As an example of the latter, for trades like houses, which can serve as
collateral, distinct houses typically entail different financial constraints.
In our model, a stable outcome always exists, where stability is as defined in the stan-
dard way in the matching literature, see, e.g., Demange and Gale (1985), Roth and So-
tomayor (1990), and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). On the other hand, a competitive
equilibrium may fail to exist. We argue that the standard definition of competitive equi-
librium should be extended by a vector of trade-dependent quantity constraints. We allow
buyers to form rational expectations on the lack of supply when their financial constraints
are binding. In case the buyer expects that the seller is not willing to supply the trade,
the buyer faces a binding quantity constraint, and the trade is excluded from the buyer’s
1See, e.g., Maskin (2000), Illing and Klu¨h (2003), and Liao (2014) for details.
2See, e.g., Che and Gale (1998), Benoit and Krishna (2001), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Dobzinski,
Lavi, and Nisan (2012), Talman and Yang (2015), and van der Laan and Yang (2016) for the analysis of
auction models with financial constraints.
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budget set. Otherwise, the buyer is free to demand this trade. Sellers are not subject to
quantity constraints. The resulting equilibrium notion is called quantity-constrained com-
petitive equilibrium (QCCE). A QCCE consists of a price vector assigning a price to each
trade, a vector of quantity constraints assigning a quantity constraint to each trade, and
an outcome. Quantity constraints are only allowed to be binding when a buyer’s financial
constraint is binding. The outcome consists of utility maximizing contracts for the buyers
and the sellers at the given prices and quantity constraints. When financial constraints are
absent or not binding, a QCCE is just a competitive equilibrium.
We first show the existence of a QCCE. The proof makes use of the existence of a stable
outcome. Given a stable outcome, we find prices and quantity constraints which together
constitute a QCCE. We also show the reverse, i.e., that each QCCE outcome is a stable
outcome, which establishes an equivalence result. We further establish the equivalence
between core outcomes and the set of QCCE outcomes.
A QCCE may involve personalized prices, where the seller charges different prices to
different buyers of the same object for instance. We investigate the existence of QCCEs
with uniform prices. We present three sets of sufficient conditions to obtain QCCEs with
seller-uniform prices, buyer-uniform prices, and uniform prices, respectively.
We analyze the structure of QCCE prices and agents’ utilities and show that the lattice
property does not hold. However, if we consider the QCCEs compatible with a given
vector of quantity constraints, then the lattice property is preserved. Due to the financial
constraints, the completeness of the lattice may fail to hold. We also show that the rural
hospital theorem fails to hold for QCCEs. However, for QCCEs compatible with a given
vector of quantity constraints, a version of the rural hospital theorem can be shown.
Finally, we relate QCCEs of models with financial constraints to Dre`ze equilibria in
general equilibrium models with price rigidities, see Be´nassy (1975), Dre`ze (1975), Youne`s
(1975), van der Laan (1980), and Herings (1996, 2018).
The connections among stable outcomes, core outcomes, and competitive equilibria have
been studied for various models. Shapley and Shubik (1971) show the equivalence between
the set of stable payoffs and the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs in the assignment
game when agents have quasi-linear utility functions. Quinzii (1984) establishes the same
result in a one-to-one multi-sided matching model and allows agents to have general utility
functions. Kojima, Sun, and Yu (2018) discuss the equivalence between the set of core
outcomes and the set of competitive equilibria in a many-to-one matching model when
agents have general utility functions, but are subject to interval constraints. In models
of trading networks, the equivalence between the set of outcomes induced by competitive
equilibria and the set of stable outcomes also holds, see Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor,
Ostrovsky, and Westkamp (2013), Candogan, Epitropou, and Vohra (2017), and Fleiner,
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Janko, Tamura, and Teytelboym (2018). Herings (2018) studies models where prices are
subject to price controls, the marriage model of Gale and Shapley (1962) being a special
case, and establishes the equivalence between the set of stable outcomes and the set of
Dre`ze equilibrium outcomes. All these equivalence results are derived in settings without
financial constraints.
In models of trading networks without financial constraints, Hatfield et al. (2013),
Candogan et al. (2017), and Schlegel (2019) provide sufficient conditions to guarantee that
an arbitrary competitive equilibrium can be transformed into a competitive equilibrium
with uniform prices by making suitable price adjustments. Different from these three
works, when financial constraints are introduced, additional conditions on the financial
constraints are needed to derive a QCCE with uniform prices from an arbitrary QCCE.
Moreover, on top of price adjustments, also changes in the quantity constraints are needed.
The lattice property of competitive equilibrium payoffs and prices is intensively in-
vestigated in various directions, like matching models, e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1971),
Demange and Gale (1985), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2010),
Kucuksenel (2011), and Kojima et al. (2018), and models of trading networks, e.g., Ostro-
vsky (2008), Hatfield and Kominers (2012), Hatfield et al. (2013), Candogan et al. (2017),
Fleiner et al. (2018), and Schlegel (2019). When financial constraints are introduced, the
lattice property of prices and agents’ utilities in QCCEs fails to hold.
The rural hospital theorem of stable matchings and competitive equilibria has been
established in different models, like matching models, e.g., Roth (1986), Demange and Gale
(1985), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2010), and Kojima et al. (2018),
and models of trading networks, e.g., Hatfield and Kominers (2012), Fleiner et al. (2018),
and Schlegel (2019). It shows the invariance of the sets of matched agents in different
stable matchings and competitive equilibria. In the presence of financial constraints, the
rural hospital theorem fails to hold for QCCEs.
Talman and Yang (2015) study the assignment model with financial constraints. There
is a single seller owning all the items and charging a uniform price for each item. Each
buyer wants to obtain at most one item. Talman and Yang (2015) constructively show
the existence of a core allocation. Since there is only one seller, the set of core allocations
is strictly larger than the set of competitive equilibria or the set of QCCEs. Van der
Laan and Yang (2016) propose an equilibrium under allotment. The outcome induced
by the equilibrium under allotment may not be in the core. Van der Laan, Talman,
and Yang (2018) propose a price adjustment process that either finds a minimum price
competitive equilibrium in a finite number of steps or exclusively validates the non-existence
of competitive equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3 presents
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the notion of stable outcome. Section 4 introduces QCCEs and shows their existence. Sec-
tion 5 studies the relations among QCCE outcomes, stable outcomes, and core outcomes,
QCCEs with uniform prices, the lattice property of QCCEs, and the rural hospital theorem
of QCCEs. Section 6 discusses the relation between models with financial constraints and
those with price controls. Section 7 contains the concluding remarks.
2 The Matching Model with Financial Constraints
There is a finite set of buyers B and a finite set of sellers S. Buyers and sellers can
participate in bilateral trades in a finite set T. Each trade t ∈ T is associated with a buyer
β(t) ∈ B and a seller σ(t) ∈ S. A trade corresponds to the precise contractual terms of the
delivery of a good or service from the seller to the buyer, but leaving out the price against
which this transaction occurs. We denote the sets of trades in T involving buyer b and
seller s by
T b = {t ∈ T | β(t) = b},
T s = {t ∈ T | σ(t) = s}.
Transactions take place by signing contracts. Each contract c = (t,m) ∈ T×R specifies
a trade τ(c) = t ∈ T and a payment µ(c) = m ∈ R, where the payment corresponds to the
amount of money that is transferred from buyer β(t) to seller σ(t). A negative payment
means that signing the contract requires a compensation from the seller to the buyer. We
consider a one-to-one matching set-up: A buyer signs a contract with at most one seller
and a seller signs a contract with at most one buyer. Each buyer and seller can choose the
no-trade option, denoted by ∅.
For each buyer b ∈ B, the utility function ub : (T b×R)∪{∅} → R is such that (b-i) for
each t ∈ T b, ub(t, ·) is continuous and strictly decreasing in R, and (b-ii) for each t ∈ T b,
there is m ∈ R such that ub(t,m) ≤ ub(∅). Condition (b-i) says that given a trade, a
lower payment improves the buyer’s utility. Condition (b-ii) says that there is a certain
monetary limit such that a buyer will not trade when the payment is above that limit.
For each seller s ∈ S, the utility function us : (T s ×R)∪ {∅} → R is such that (s-i) for
each t ∈ T s, us(t, ·) is continuous and strictly increasing in R, and (s-ii) for each t ∈ T s,
there is m ∈ R such that us(t,m) ≤ us(∅). Condition (s-i) says that given a trade, a higher
payment improves the seller’s utility. Condition (s-ii) says that there is a certain monetary
limit such that the seller will not trade when the payment is below that limit.
Conditions (b-i) and (s-i) allow for the case where a trade t ∈ T i is better than a trade
t′ ∈ T i for agent i ∈ B ∪ S, irrespective of the amount of money involved: For every
m,m′ ∈ R, ui(t,m) > ui(t′,m′). Let u = (ui)i∈B∪S be the profile of utility functions.
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Buyers may face both liquidity and credit constraints, which we refer to as financial
constraints in the sequel. In case of financial constraints, there is a maximum amount of
money that buyers can use to make payments. For every buyer b ∈ B, for every trade
t ∈ T b, the corresponding financial constraint is denoted by lbt ∈ R+ = R+ ∪ {+∞}. If
lbt = +∞, then there is no financial constraint for buyer b when making the trade t. We
use the notation lb = (lbt)t∈T b and l = (l
b)b∈B.
The primitives of the economy are summarized by E = (B, S, T, u, l).
Our model of matching with contracts and financial constraints includes the two im-
portant models below as special cases.
Example 2.1: The matching model without financial constraints, e.g., Crawford and
Knoer (1981), Demange and Gale (1985), and Alkan and Gale (1990).
There are finite sets B and S of agents who want to match with one another. Agents
that match can make use of monetary transfers. An agent i ∈ B ∪ S has a stand-alone
utility ri of being unmatched. The matchings of agents in B and S can be modeled by the
set of trades T = B × S. Being unmatched corresponds to the no-trade option ∅. Utility
functions are general and satisfy assumptions (b-i), (b-ii), (s-i), and (s-ii), together with an
assumption of “finiteness,” i.e., for each i ∈ B ∪ S and each t ∈ T i, the range of ui(t, ·) is
all of R. The stand-alone value of an agent i ∈ B ∪S is defined as ri = ui(∅). Since agents
do not face financial constraints, we have lbt = +∞ for each b ∈ B and for each t ∈ T b.
Example 2.2: The assignment model with financial constraints, e.g., Talman and Yang
(2015), van der Laan and Yang (2016), and van der Laan et al. (2018).
There is a finite set of buyers B and a finite set of sellers S. Each seller owns one
item and is only willing to sell if the price is above a positive reserve price. A buyer is
interested in at most one item. Buyers have financial constraints, which are independent
of the items to be bought. Buyers have quasi-linear utility functions. As in Example 2.1,
we can take the set of trades equal to T = B × S. For every b ∈ B, ub(∅) = 0 and, for
every t ∈ T b, ub(t,m) = ub(t, 0)−m. Since financial constraints do not depend on the item
bought, we have, for every t, t′ ∈ T b, lbt = lbt′ . For every seller s ∈ S, us(∅) > 0 denotes the
reserve price for the item in the possession of seller s and, for every t, t′ ∈ T s, it holds that
us(t, ·) = us(t′, ·), so the identity of the buyer does not matter for the seller.
3 Stable Outcomes
In this section, we define the standard notions of stable and strongly stable outcomes, see,
e.g., Demange and Gale (1985), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), and Hatfield and Milgrom
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(2005). We show that a stable outcome exists. We present an example to show that a
strongly stable outcome may not exist.
Given a set of contracts Y ⊆ T × R, Y b denotes the set of contracts involving buyer b
and Y s denotes the set of contracts involving seller s, so
Y b = {c ∈ Y | β(τ(c)) = b},
Y s = {c ∈ Y | σ(τ(c)) = s}.
Notice that in case there is no contract in Y involving an agent i ∈ B ∪ S, then Y i = ∅.
Denote the set of feasible contracts by Y , i.e.,
Y = {(t,m) ∈ T × R | m ≤ lβ(t)t }.
The payment as specified in a feasible contract is compatible with the buyer’s financial
constraint.
A set of contracts A ⊆ Y is an outcome if for each i ∈ B ∪ S, |Ai| ≤ 1, so an outcome
is a set of feasible contracts such that each agent is involved in at most one contract. Let
A be the collection of outcomes, i.e.,
A = {A ⊆ Y | for each i ∈ B ∪ S, ∣∣Ai∣∣ ≤ 1}.
Notice that ∅ ∈ A. For each i ∈ B ∪ S, let Ai be the collection of singletons involving a
contract for agent i together with the no-trade option ∅, i.e.,
Ai = {A ∈ A | for every c ∈ A, i ∈ β(τ(c)) ∪ σ(τ(c))}.
For every i ∈ B ∪ S, the utility function ui over contracts induces the utility function U i
over outcomes, for every A ∈ A,
U i(A) =
{
ui(∅),
ui(c),
if Ai = ∅,
if Ai = {c}.
For each i ∈ B ∪S, for each Y ⊆ Y , the set of optimal choices of agent i within the set
of contracts Y is defined as
Chi(Y ) = arg max
{Ai∈Ai|Ai⊆Y i}
U i(Ai).
In case Y is finite, it holds that Chi(Y ) is non-empty. Notice that Chi(Y ) = {∅} means
that the no-trade option is the optimal choice in Y for agent i.
Definition 3.1: An outcome A ∈ A is stable if:
(i) For each i ∈ B ∪ S, Ai ∈ Chi(A).
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(ii) There is no c = (t,m) ∈ Y such that Uβ(t)({c}) > Uβ(t)(A) and Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(A).
A stable outcome A is a set of feasible contracts, containing at most one contract for each
agent. Condition (i) of Definition 3.1 corresponds to individual rationality. Agent i is
involved in a contract which is at least as good as no trade. Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1
corresponds to the absence of a blocking pair. There are no two agents who can sign a
contract that makes both of them better off.
The basic idea of showing the existence of a stable outcome is as follows. First, we
discretize the payments of contracts in Y and remove contracts that are worse than the
no-trade option, leading to a finite set of feasible contracts with discretized payments Y
ε
.
Then we use an adjustment process in the spirit of Gale and Shapley (1962), Crawford and
Knoer (1981), Kelso and Crawford (1982), Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986), and
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) that ends with a stable outcome for the set Y
ε
. Finally, we
can use a limit argument to show that there is a stable outcome in Y .
For every b ∈ B, for every t ∈ T b, let mbt ∈ R be such that ub(t,mbt) ≤ ub(∅) and
mbt = min{lbt ,mbt}. For every s ∈ S, for every t ∈ T s, let mst ∈ R be such that mst ≤ mβ(t)t
and us(t,mst) ≤ us(∅). For each ε > 0, the finite set of contracts Y ε is defined by
Y
ε
= {(t,m) ∈ Y | ∃k ∈ Z+ such that m = min{mσ(t)t + kε,mβ(t)t }}.
We now present an adjustment process to show that there is a stable outcome for the set
of feasible contracts Y
ε
.
Definition 3.2: Let some ε > 0 be given. The adjustment process consists of the following
steps.
Step 0: Define Y 0 = Y
ε
andA0 = ∅. Each buyer b ∈ B chooses one element Z0b ∈ Chb(Y 0).
Define Z0 = ∪b∈BZ0b. Each seller s ∈ σ(Z0) tentatively accepts one element A1s ∈ Chs(Z0).
Define A1 = ∪s∈SA1s. If A1 = Z0, then the process terminates and the contracts in A1 are
permanently accepted. Otherwise, go to Step 1.
Step k(≥ 1): Define Y k = Y k−1\(Zk−1\Ak). Each buyer b ∈ B\β(Ak) chooses one ele-
ment Zkb ∈ Chb(Y k). Define Zk = Ak ∪ (∪b∈B\β(Ak)Zkb). Each seller s ∈ σ(Zk) tentatively
accepts one element A(k+1)s ∈ Chs(Zk). Define Ak+1 = ∪s∈SA(k+1)s. If Ak+1 = Zk, then
the process terminates and the contracts in Ak+1 are permanently accepted. Otherwise, go
to Step k + 1.
Lemma 3.3: For each ε > 0, the adjustment process terminates in a finite number of steps
with a set of permanently accepted contracts. This set constitutes a stable outcome for Y
ε
.
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Results that are closely related to Lemma 3.3 have been shown by, e.g., Crawford and
Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982) in setting without financial constraints. For
completeness, we provide a formal proof of Lemma 3.3 in Appendix A.1.
Now we state the existence result.
Proposition 3.4: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Then a stable outcome exists.
Proof : See Appendix A.2. Q.E.D.
Alkan and Gale (1990) establish the existence of stable outcome in the matching model
without financial constraints, as described in Example 2.1. That result is a by-product of
Proposition 3.4.
We next give the definition of a strongly stable outcome.
Definition 3.5: An outcome A ∈ A is strongly stable if:
(i) For each i ∈ B ∪ S, Ai ∈ Chi(A).
(ii) There is no c = (t,m) ∈ Y such that Uβ(t)({c}) ≥ Uβ(t)(A) and Uσ(t)({c}) ≥ Uσ(t)(A),
with at least one inequality being strict.
Condition (i) in Definition 3.5 coincides with Condition (i) in Definition 3.1. Condition (ii)
in Definition 3.5 is stronger than Condition (ii) in Definition 3.1 since in Definition 3.5 it
is sufficient that only one of the trading partners has a strict improvement for a pairwise
deviation to occur.
In the one-to-one matching with contracts model, if there are no financial constraints,
then a stable outcome is also strongly stable (Crawford and Knoer, 1981; Demange and
Gale, 1985). As we will see, in the presence of financial constraints, a strongly stable out-
come may not exist.
Example 3.6: Let B = {b1, b2}, S = {s1}, and T = {t, t′}, where β(t) = b1 and β(t′) = b2.
For each i ∈ B ∪ S, let ui(∅) = 0. Let ub1(t,m) = 3 − m, ub2(t′,m) = 4 − m, and
us1(t,m) = us1(t′,m) = m. The financial constraints of the buyers are given by lb1t = 2
and lb2t′ = 2. The set of feasible contracts is then given by Y = {(t,m) ∈ T × R | m ≤ 2}.
The collection of outcomes is A = {∅} ∪ {{(t,m)} | m ≤ 2} ∪ {{(t′,m)} | m ≤ 2}.
By contradiction, suppose that the outcome A ∈ A is strongly stable.
First, we show that A 6= ∅. Suppose A = ∅. Consider c = (t, 2) ∈ Y . Since U b1(A) =
0 < 1 = U b1({c}) and U s1(A) = 0 < 2 = U s1({c}), Condition (ii) of Definition 3.5 is
violated, contradicting that A is a strongly stable outcome. Consequently, it holds that
A 6= ∅.
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We have that A ∈ {{(t,m)} | m ≤ 2} ∪ {{(t′,m)} | m ≤ 2}. By individual rationality
for the seller it follows that A ∈ {{(t,m)} | 0 ≤ m ≤ 2} ∪ {{(t′,m)} | 0 ≤ m ≤ 2}.
Suppose A = {(t,m)} for some m ∈ [0, 2]. Consider c = (t′, 2) ∈ Y . Since U b2(A) =
0 < 2 = U b2({c}) and U s1(A) = m ≤ 2 = U s1({c}), Condition (ii) of Definition 3.5 is
violated, contradicting that A is a strongly stable outcome.
We have that A = {(t′,m)} for some m ∈ [0, 2]. Consider c = (t, 2) ∈ Y . Since
U b1(A) = 0 < 1 = U b1({c}) and U s1(A) = m ≤ 2 = U s1({c}), Condition (ii) of Defini-
tion 3.5 is violated, contradicting that A is a strongly stable outcome.
We have shown that there is no strongly stable outcome.
4 Quantity-constrained Competitive Equilibrium
In the competitive analysis of matching models with contracts and financial constraints,
each trade t ∈ T is assigned a price pt ∈ R, resulting in a price vector p ∈ RT . Prices
are allowed to be personalized. For example, the price vector p ∈ RT can be such that a
seller s ∈ S can sell the same physical commodity at different prices to different buyers.
Personalized prices have been used before in competitive settings, see, e.g., Koopmans and
Beckmann (1957), Makowski (1979), Hatfield et al. (2013), Candogan et al. (2017), and
Fleiner et al. (2018).
In a competitive equilibrium, buyers and sellers take prices p ∈ RT as given and choose
optimal trades. We now argue that in the economy of Example 3.6, a competitive equilib-
rium does not exist. We argue first that there are no competitive equilibria without trade.
The seller is only not willing to supply a trade if the price is less than or equal to zero,
but then there is demand by both buyers. Since there is only one seller, a single unit will
therefore be traded at a competitive equilibrium. To get a total demand of one unit, the
price of one trade has to be above 2 and the price of the other trade should be less than
or equal to 2. The seller will then choose to supply the trade with a price above 2, but for
that trade there is no demand. This shows that there is no competitive equilibrium in the
economy of Example 3.6.
The price system where both prices are equal to 2 does not correspond to a competitive
equilibrium. The reason is that there is a total demand of two units at these prices, whereas
the seller is only going to supply one unit. Nevertheless, we will argue that these prices
should be regarded as equilibrium prices. We achieve this by extending the standard notion
of competitive equilibrium by a vector of quantity constraints.
In case the financial constraint is binding for some trade, we allow the buyer to hold
the expectation that there is no supply of such a trade by the seller and we refer to such
an expectation as a quantity constraint. These expectations should be rational, so at
equilibrium, if a buyer expects a quantity constraint on a trade, then there should indeed
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be no supply by the seller of that trade. For each t ∈ T , let qt ∈ {0, 1} be the quantity
constraint of trade t, where qt = 0 means that buyer β(t) expects trade t to be supplied
and qt = 1 means that buyer β(t) expects that trade t is not available. We denote the
vector of quantity constraints by q = (qt)t∈T .
The budget set of buyer b ∈ B at (p, q) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T is given by
γb(p, q) = {{c} ∈ A | τ(c) ∈ T b, µ(c) = pτ(c), and qτ(c) = 0} ∪ {∅}.
The budget set of buyer b is non-empty, since it always contains the no-trade option, ∅.
The demand set of buyer b ∈ B at (p, q) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T is given by
δb(p, q) = arg max
Ab∈γb(p,q)
U b(Ab).
Since a seller does not face financial constraints, the seller’s decision problem is the
usual one. The budget set of seller s ∈ S at p ∈ RT is given by
γs(p) = {{c} ∈ A | τ(c) ∈ T s and µ(c) = pτ(c)} ∪ {∅}.
The demand set of seller s ∈ S at p ∈ RT is given by
δs(p) = arg max
As∈γs(p)
U s(As).
We are now in a position to define our equilibrium concept.
Definition 4.1: An element (p, q, A) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T × A is a quantity-constrained com-
petitive equilibrium (QCCE) for the economy E = (B, S, T, u, l) if:
(i) For each b ∈ B, Ab ∈ δb(p, q).
(ii) For each s ∈ S, As ∈ δs(p).
(iii) For each t ∈ T , if pt < lβ(t)t , then qt = 0.
The first two conditions correspond to standard optimization by buyers and sellers that
take p and q as given. These two conditions also imply equality of demand and supply at
a QCCE. The third condition reflects that when the price of trade t is below buyer β(t)’s
financial constraint, then buyer β(t) does not expect a quantity constraint on trade t. If,
for every t ∈ T, qt = 0, then a QCCE reduces to a competitive equilibrium. It follows from
Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1 that in models without financial constraints, i.e., for every
t ∈ T, lβ(t)t = +∞, a QCCE reduces to a competitive equilibrium.
Consider a QCCE with qt = 1 for some t ∈ T. It holds that the expectations of buyer
β(t) are rational. Indeed, since {(t, pt)} /∈ γβ(t)(p, q), it holds that (t, pt) does not belong
to the QCCE outcome A, so Aσ(t) does not involve trade t, and trade t is therefore not
supplied by seller σ(t).
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Example 4.2 illustrates the concept of QCCE for the economy of Example 3.6. It also
presents the formal argument that a competitive equilibrium does not exist in the economy
of Example 3.6.
Example 4.2: Consider the economy of Example 3.6. We show that there is no competitive
equilibrium. Suppose, to derive a contradiction, that a competitive equilibrium exists or,
equivalently, that there is a QCCE (p, q, A) with qt = qt′ = 0. We have that δ
b1(p, q) =
{{(t, pt)}} if pt ≤ 2 and δb2(p, q) = {{(t′, pt′)}} if pt′ ≤ 2. Buyers therefore demand a total
of two units if max{pt, pt′} ≤ 2, which implies there cannot be equality of supply and
demand. It follows that max{pt, pt′} > 2. It also holds that δb1(p, q) = {∅} if pt > 2 and
δb2(p, q) = {∅} if pt′ > 2. There is no demand if min{pt, pt′} > 2, whereas supply equals
one unit in this case, so again there is no equality of supply and demand. It follows that
min{pt, pt′} ≤ 2. Since min{pt, pt′} ≤ 2 < max{pt, pt′}, it holds that pt 6= pt′ and only one
of these prices exceeds 2. The seller will supply the trade with the highest price, whereas
the buyer involved in this trade will demand the no-trade option. We have obtained a
contradiction. Consequently, a competitive equilibrium does not exist.
Let (p, q, A) be such that p = (pt, pt′) = (2, 2), q = (qt, qt′) = (1, 0), and A = {(t′, 2)}.
We show that (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
First, (p, q, A) satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 4.1. For buyer b1, it holds
that γb1(p, q) = {∅} and so Ab1 = ∅ ∈ δb1(p, q) = {∅}. For buyer b2, it holds that
γb2(p, q) = {∅, {(t′, 2)}} and Ab2 = A = {(t′, 2)} ∈ δb2(p, q) = {{(t′, 2)}}. For seller s1, it
holds that γs1(p) = {{(t, 2)}, {(t′, 2)}, ∅}. We have that As1 = A = {(t′, 2)} ∈ δs1(p) =
{{(t, 2)}, {(t′, 2)}}.
It is easily seen that (p, q, A) satisfies Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1.
Obviously, a similar argument can be used to show that (p′, q′, A′) such that p′ =
(p′t, p
′
t′) = (2, 2), q
′ = (q′t, q
′
t′) = (0, 1), and A
′ = {(t, 2)} is a QCCE.
The following result provides the key to show the existence of a QCCE. It says that given
a stable outcome A, we can always find a suitable price vector p and a vector of quantity
constraints q such that (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
Proposition 4.3: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Let A be a stable outcome of
E. Then there is a pair (p, q) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T such that (p, q, A) is a QCCE for E.
Proof : See Appendix A.3. Q.E.D.
The sketch of the proof of Proposition 4.3 is as follows. For every buyer b ∈ B we
partition the set of trades T b into three classes. The first class consists of the trades such
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that at any payment, buyer b prefers Ab to those trades. A trade belongs to the second
class if there is a payment satisfying the financial constraint of buyer b for that trade and
being such that buyer b is indifferent between Ab and that trade. The third class consists
of the trades such that at any payment satisfying the financial constraints of buyer b, buyer
b strictly prefers those trades to Ab. For every seller s ∈ S, we divide the trades in T s into
two classes. The first class consists of the trades such that at any payment, seller s prefers
As to those trades. A trade belongs to the second class if there is a payment making seller
s indifferent between As and that trade.
On the basis of these partitions, we assign to each trade a price and a quantity con-
straint. Each trade that is part of the stable outcome is assigned a price equal to the
amount of money in the associated contract and a quantity constraint equal to zero. A
quantity constraint is set equal to one if and only if a trade belongs to the third class for
the buyer. A trade belonging to the second class of the seller is assigned a price equal to
the payment that makes the seller indifferent. A trade belonging to the first class of the
seller is assigned a price equal to the payment making the buyer not better off than at the
stable outcome.
Propositions 3.4 and 4.3 imply the existence of a QCCE.
Corollary 4.4: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Then a QCCE exists.
5 Properties of QCCEs
In this section, we investigate the features of QCCEs in more detail. In turn, we study
the equivalence between QCCE outcomes and stable outcomes, the equivalence between
QCCE outcomes and core outcomes, the existence of QCCEs with uniform prices, the
lattice property of QCCEs, and the rural hospital theorem of QCCEs.
5.1 Equivalence between QCCE Outcomes and Stable Outcomes
Shapley and Shubik (1971) consider the assignment game and show that the set of stable
payoffs coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Such an equivalence
relation is extended to capture one-to-one multi-sided matching by Quinzii (1984), trading
networks by Hatfield et al. (2013), Candogan et al. (2017), and Fleiner et al. (2018), and
one-to-one matching with price controls by Herings (2018). The following result establishes
the equivalence in a setting with financial constraints.
For an economy E , let
ASO(E) = {A ∈ A | A is a stable outcome}
AQCCE(E) = {A ∈ A | there is (p, q) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T such that (p, q, A) is a QCCE}
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be the set of stable outcomes and the set of QCCE outcomes of E , respectively.
Theorem 5.1 establishes the equivalence between ASO(E) and AQCCE(E).
Theorem 5.1: Consider an economy E= (B , S ,T , u, l). Then ASO(E) = AQCCE(E) 6= ∅.
Proof : See Appendix A.4. Q.E.D.
Since our model contains the assignment model with financial constraints as a special case,
the above equivalence result also holds in that model. In the assignment model with finan-
cial constraints, Definition 3.1 in van der Laan and Yang (2016) presents the notion of an
equilibrium under allotment.
Definition 5.2: Let the economy E correspond to the assignment model with financial
constraints, see Example 2.2. An element (p, q, A) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T × A is an equilibrium
under allotment of E if:
(i) For each b ∈ B, Ab ∈ δb(p, q).
(ii) For each s ∈ S, As ∈ δs(p).
(iii) For each t ∈ T , if qt = 1, then {(t, pt)} ∈ δβ(t)(p, (q−t, 0)) and there is c′ = (t′,m′) ∈ A
such that σ(t′) = σ(t), β(t′) 6= β(t), and pt′ = m′ = lβ(t
′)
t′ .
If a buyer expects a quantity constraint on an item in an equilibrium under allotment,
then the seller is trading the item with another buyer whose financial constraint is binding.
We now give an example such that the outcome of an equilibrium under allotment is not
stable. This equilibrium notion is therefore qualitatively different from a QCCE.
Example 5.3: Let B = {b1, b2}, S = {s1}, and T = {t, t′}, where β(t) = b1 and β(t′) = b2.
For each i ∈ B ∪ S, let ui(∅) = 0. Let ub1(t,m) = 3 − m, ub2(t′,m) = 4 − m, and
us1(t,m) = us1(t′,m) = m. The financial constraints of the buyers are given by lb1t = 2 and
lb2t′ = 3. This is the same economy as in Example 3.6, except that the financial constraint
of buyer b2 has been raised from 2 to 3. It is easily verified that the collection of stable
outcomes is ASO(E) = {{(t′,m)} | 2 ≤ m ≤ 3}.
Let p = (pt, pt′) = (2, 2), q = (qt, qt′) = (0, 1), and A = {(t, 2)}. It is not hard to see
that (p, q, A) is an equilibrium under allotment. However, A /∈ ASO(E), i.e., A is not a
stable outcome.
5.2 Equivalence between QCCE Outcomes and Core Outcomes
In the following, we discuss the relation between QCCE outcomes and core outcomes in
the presence of financial constraints.
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Definition 5.4: An outcome A ∈ A is a core outcome if there is no outcome A′ ∈ A and
a set of agents N ⊆ B ∪ S such that:
(i) For each i ∈ (B ∪ S)\N, (A′)i = ∅.
(ii) For each j ∈ N, U j(A′) > U j(A).
Given an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l), let
C(E) = {A ∈ A | A is a core outcome}
be the core of E .
Proposition 5.5: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Then C(E) = ASO(E) =
AQCCE(E) 6= ∅.
Proof : See Appendix A.5. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.5 shows that all main solution concepts coincide. Core outcomes correspond
to QCCE outcomes, which have already been shown to correspond to stable outcomes.
Definition 5.6: An outcome A ∈ A is a strict core outcome if there is no outcome A′ ∈ A
and a set of agents N ⊆ B ∪ S such that:
(i) For each i ∈ (B ∪ S)\N, (A′)i = ∅.
(ii) For each j ∈ N, U j(A′) ≥ U j(A), with at least one strict inequality.
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.5, we can show that the set of strongly stable
outcomes is equivalent to the set of strict core outcomes. Thus, using Example 3.6, we
can also conclude that the set of strict core outcomes can be empty in the matching model
with financial constraints.
5.3 QCCE with Uniform Prices
For markets where all trading opportunities are universally available, it is conventional to
require that prices are uniform in a competitive equilibrium, i.e. each object is assigned a
single price, see, e.g., Gul and Stacchetti (1999), Sun and Yang (2006), and Herings (2018).
In the absence of financial constraints, given an arbitrary competitive equilibrium with
personalized prices, one can obtain both a competitive equilibrium with seller-uniform
prices and a competitive equilibrium with buyer-uniform prices by adjusting the prices,
while keeping the equilibrium trades the same, see, e.g., Hatfield et al. (2013), Candogan et
al. (2017), and Schlegel (2019). In the presence of financial constraints, given an arbitrary
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QCCE with personalized prices, one also has to take the quantity constraints into account
in order to obtain a QCCE with uniform prices. In this subsection, we present results with
sufficient conditions to have QCCEs with seller-uniform prices, buyer-uniform prices, and
uniform prices.
First we look at the sellers’ side. Given s ∈ S, two trades t, t′ ∈ T s are said to be
s-equivalent, denoted t ∼s t′, if us(t, ·) = us(t′, ·). Since ∼s is an equivalence relation, the
collection of equivalence classes of T s induced by ∼s forms a partition of T s, denoted by
T s. A typical example of s-equivalent trades occurs in the assignment model with financial
constraints, where the seller of an item does not care to whom the item is sold. In this
case it holds that T s = {T s}. The collection T S = ∪s∈ST s is a partition of T with the
property that for every I ∈ T S there is s ∈ S such that I is a set of s-equivalent trades.
A QCCE has seller-uniform prices if all trades that belong to the same set in T S have the
same price. The next result states the existence of a QCCE with seller-uniform prices.
Proposition 5.7: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Then there is a QCCE with
seller-uniform prices.
Proof : See Appendix A.6. Q.E.D.
The sketch of the proof of Proposition 5.7 is as follows. By Corollary 4.4, there is always
a QCCE (p, q, A). Take some I1 ∈ T S. Then we show how to derive a QCCE (p1, q1, A1)
such that q1 = q, A1 = A, for every t ∈ T \ I1, p1t = pt, and, for every t, t′ ∈ I1, p1t = p1t′ .
Then, by a similar argument, given (p1, q1, A1) and I2 ∈ T S \ {I1}, we can derive a QCCE
(p2, q2, A2) such that q2 = q1, A2 = A1, for every t ∈ T \I2, p2t = p1t , and, for every t, t′ ∈ I2,
p2t = p
2
t′ , and so on.
To define (p1, q1, A1), we adjust the prices p in the following way. For each trade in I1,
we use the maximum price among all prices of trades in I1 as the uniform price of trades in
I1. We keep the prices of other trades unchanged. More formally, we have, for each t ∈ I1,
p1t = maxt′∈I1 pt′ , and for each t ∈ T\I1, p1t = pt. The vector of quantity constraints q and
the outcome A need no adjustment: q1 = q and A1 = A. If a trade belongs to I1 ∩ τ(A),
then its price is equal to the maximum among all trades in I1.
We now look at the buyers’ side. Given b ∈ B, two trades t, t′ ∈ T b are said to be
b-equivalent, denoted t ∼b t′, if lbt = lbt′ and ub(t, ·) = ub(t′, ·). Since ∼b is an equivalence
relation, the collection of equivalence classes of T b induced by ∼b forms a partition of T b,
denoted by T b. The collection T B = ∪b∈BT b is a partition of T with the property that
for every I ∈ T B there is b ∈ B such that I is a set of b-equivalent trades. A QCCE has
buyer-uniform prices if all trades that belong to the same set in T B have the same price.
The next result states the existence of a QCCE with buyer-uniform prices.
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Proposition 5.8: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Then there is a QCCE with
buyer-uniform prices.
Proof : See Appendix A.7. Q.E.D.
The sketch of the proof of Proposition 5.8 is as follows. By Corollary 4.4, a QCCE (p, q, A)
exists. Let some I1 ∈ T B be given. Then we show how to derive a QCCE (p1, q1, A1) such
that, for every t ∈ T \ I1, p1t = pt, and, for every t, t′ ∈ I1, p1t = p1t′ . Then, by a similar
argument, given (p1, q1, A1) and I2 ∈ T B \ {I1}, we can derive a QCCE (p2, q2, A2) such
that, for every t ∈ T \ I2, p2t = p1t , and, for every t, t′ ∈ I2, p2t = p2t′ , and so on.
The QCCE (p1, q1, A1) is derived as follows. For each trade in I1, we use the minimum
price among all prices of trades in I1 as the uniform price of trades in I1. The prices of other
trades are kept unchanged. More precisely, we have, for each t ∈ I1, p1t = mint′∈I1 pt′ and,
for each t ∈ T\I1, p1t = pt. Then we adjust the vector of quantity constraints for trades in
I1. For each t ∈ I1 such that pt > lb1t and p1t = lb1t we define q1t = 1. For each t ∈ I1 such
that qt = 1 and p
1
t < l
b1
t , we define q
1
t = 0. Quantity constraints for other trades remain
the same. Finally, the equilibrium outcome remains the same, A1 = A.
Proposition 5.8 states that there is a QCCE with buyer-uniform prices. Using that
result, it is not hard to show that there is a QCCE with buyer-uniform prices and buyer-
uniform quantity constraints, where the latter property means that for every I ∈ T B, for
every t, t′ ∈ I, qt = qt′ .
Consider trades t, t′, and t′′ such that t ∼s t′ and t ∼b t′′. By Proposition 5.7 there
exists a QCCE (p, q, A) such that pt = pt′ . By Proposition 5.8 there is a QCCE (p, q, A)
such that pt = pt′′ . The next example shows that there may not be a QCCE (p, q, A) such
that pt = pt′ = pt′′ .
Example 5.9: Let B = {b1, b2} and S = {s1, s2}. Let T = {t11, t21, t22}, where tij de-
notes the trade such that β(tij) = bi and σ(tij) = sj. Let l
b1
t11 = 4 and l
b2
t21 = l
b2
t22 = 1.
Utility functions are such that, for every i ∈ B ∪ S, ui(∅) = 0, ub1(t11,m) = 6 − m,
ub2(t21,m) = u
b2(t22,m) = 4−m, us1(t11,m) = us1(t21,m) = m−2, and us2(t22,m) = m. It
is easily seen that T B = {{t11}, {t21, t22}} and T S = {{t11, t21}, {t22}}. By Proposition 5.7
there exists a QCCE (p, q, A) with pt11 = pt21 . It holds that pt11 ≥ 2, since otherwise there is
no supply of t11 by seller s1, whereas there is demand for it by buyer b1. By Proposition 5.8
there exists a QCCE (p′, q′, A′) with p′t21 = p
′
t22
. It holds that p′t22 ≤ 1, since otherwise
there is no demand for t22 by buyer b2, whereas there is supply of t22 by seller s2. We have
demonstrated that pt21 6= p′t21 , so there is no QCCE with prices of t11, t21, and t22 all the
same.
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In general equilibrium theory, two identical commodities are traded at the same price by
the definition of a competitive equilibrium. In Example 5.9, although the trades do not
involve the specification of a commodity, nothing precludes that all trades correspond to
identical commodities. Example 5.9 then presents a case where no QCCE has the property
that identical commodities are traded at the same price.
We now put some extra structure on the economy by making the commodity that is
being traded explicit. Let L be the set of commodities. The set of trades is defined as
T = B × S × L. The commodity associated to a trade t ∈ T is denoted by λ(t), so for
t = (b, s, `) it holds that λ(t) = `. The concept of a commodity contains all information that
is relevant for utility functions and financial constraints. In other words, the utility of a
trade depends only on the traded commodity. Also, the financial constraint corresponding
to a trade depends only on the traded commodity. More formally, for every t, t′ ∈ T such
that λ(t) = λ(t′) and β(t) = β(t′) = b, we have that lbt = l
b
t′ and u
b(t, ·) = ub(t′, ·). For
every t, t′ ∈ T such that λ(t) = λ(t′) and σ(t) = σ(t′) = s, we have that us(t, ·) = us(t′, ·).
We refer to this set-up as an economy with commodities.
In an economy with commodities it is assumed for simplicity that any triple (b, s, `) ∈
B × S × L corresponds to a trade. This assumption is without loss of generality, since
our assumptions on utility functions are sufficiently weak to allow for the case where a
trade t = (b, s, `) is such that, for every m ∈ R, ub(t,m) < U b(∅) and, for every m ∈ R,
us(t,m) < U s(∅). In other words, even under the assumption that T = B × S × L, it can
be modeled that certain buyers are not interested in some commodities and certain sellers
cannot supply some commodities.
A QCCE (p, q, A) of an economy with commodities is said to have uniform prices if for
every t, t′ ∈ T such that λ(t) = λ(t′) we have that pt = pt′ .
In an economy with commodities, it holds that, for every b ∈ B, T b = {{b}× S ×{`} |
` ∈ L}, and, for every s ∈ S, T s = {B × {s} × {`} | ` ∈ L}. If a QCCE (p, q, A) of an
economy with commodities has uniform prices, then it also has buyer-uniform and seller-
uniform prices. The next result shows that an economy with commodities has a QCCE
with uniform prices.
Theorem 5.10: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l) with commodities. Then there is
a QCCE with uniform prices.
Proof : See Appendix A.8. Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 5.10 first uses the result of Proposition 5.8 to establish the existence
of a QCCE (p, q, A) with buyer-uniform prices. This implies that pt can only depend on
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β(t) and λ(t). Next a QCCE (p, q, A) with uniform prices is constructed by defining pt′ as
the maximum of pt over all trades such that λ(t) = λ(t
′).
Theorem 5.10 states that there is a QCCE with uniform prices. However, there may
not exist a QCCE with uniform prices and uniform quantity constraints, where the latter
property means that for every t, t′ ∈ T such that λ(t) = λ(t′) we have that qt = qt′ .
In Example 4.2, there are only two QCCEs, and both of them are QCCEs with uniform
prices, i.e., (p, q, A) with p = (pt, pt′) = (2, 2), q = (qt, qt′) = (1, 0), and A = {(t′, 2)}, and
(p′, q′, A′) with p′ = (p′t, p
′
t′) = (2, 2), q
′ = (q′t, q
′
t′) = (0, 1), and A
′ = {(t, 2)}. Nevertheless,
those two QCCEs fail to have uniform quantity constraints.
Consider the assignment model with financial constraints, where the items sold by the
sellers are all identical. Such an assignment model leads to an economy with commodities
where the set L is a singleton. Theorem 5.10 then establishes the existence of a QCCE
where all trades have the same price.
5.4 The Lattice Property
The lattice property of competitive equilibrium payoffs and prices is intensively investigated
in various directions. The lattice structure guarantees the existence of one-sided optimal
outcomes and provides the possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanism, see, e.g.,
Shapley and Shubik (1971), Demange and Gale (1985), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hat-
field and Kojima (2010), Kucuksenel (2011), and Kojima et al. (2018) in matching models
without financial constraints, and Ostrovsky (2008), Hatfield and Kominers (2012), Hat-
field et al. (2013), Candogan et al. (2017), Fleiner et al. (2018), and Schlegel (2019) in
models of trading networks.
In the presence of financial constraints, the lattice structure of prices and agents’ wel-
fare induced by QCCEs fails to hold, as exemplified next.
Example 5.11: Let B = {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5} and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}. Let tij be the trade
such that β(tij) = bi and σ(tij) = sj. Let T = {t11, t12, t21, t24, t32, t35, t43, t44, t53, t55}. For
each i ∈ B ∪ S, let ui(∅) = 0. For each b ∈ B and each t ∈ T b, let ub(t,m) = ub(t, 0)−m.
For each s ∈ S and each t ∈ T s, let us(t,m) = m. Let ub1(t11, 0) = ub1(t12, 0) = 10,
ub2(t21, 0) = 10, u
b2(t24, 0) = 5, u
b3(t32, 0) = 10, u
b3(t35, 0) = 5, u
b4(t43, 0) = 2, u
b4(t44, 0) =
10, ub5(t53, 0) = 2, and u
b5(t55, 0) = 10. For each b ∈ B and each t ∈ T b, let lbt = 1.
Let (p, q, A) be such that
p = (pt11 , pt12 , pt21 , pt24 , pt32 , pt35 , pt43 , pt44 , pt53 , pt55) = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1),
q = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1),
A = {(t12, 1), (t21, 1), (t35, 1), (t44, 0), (t53, 1)}.
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At (p, q, A), all trades corresponding to a given seller have the same price, so the seller is
indifferent between supplying any of them. Every buyer gets the most preferred trade in
his budget set. A quantity constraint is expected by buyers b3 and b5 for a trade with price
equal to the corresponding financial constraint. It follows that (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
Let (p′, q′, A′) be such that
p′ = (p′t11 , p
′
t12
, p′t21 , p
′
t24
, p′t32 , p
′
t35
, p′t43 , p
′
t44
, p′t53 , p
′
t55
) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0),
q′ = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0),
A′ = {(t11, 1), (t24, 1), (t32, 1), (t43, 1), (t55, 0)}.
At (p′, q′, A′), all trades corresponding to a given seller have the same price, so the seller
is indifferent between supplying any of them. Every buyer gets the most preferred trade
in his budget set. A quantity constraint is expected by buyers b2 and b4 for a trade with
price equal to the corresponding financial constraint. It follows that (p′, q′, A′) is a QCCE.
Let p ∈ RT be such that, for every t ∈ T , p
t
= min{pt, p′t}. Then it holds that
p = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0). In the following, we show that there is no (q, A) ∈ {0, 1}T ×A
such that (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
By contradiction, suppose that there is (q, A) ∈ {0, 1}T × A such that (p, q, A) is a
QCCE. Since p
t35
= p
t55
= p
t24
= p
t44
= 0 < 1 = lb3t35 = l
b5
t55 = l
b2
t24 = l
b4
t44 , it holds
by Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1 that qt35 = qt55 = qt24 = qt44 = 0. It follows that
δb4(p, q) = {{(t44, 0)}} and δb5(p, q) = {{(t55, 0)}}. Consequently, neither buyer b4 nor
buyer b5 makes a transaction with seller s3. Since pt43
= p
t53
= 1, it holds that δs3(p, q) =
{{(t43, 1)}, {(t53, 1)}}. This means that seller s3 makes a transaction with either buyer b4
or buyer b5, leading to a contradiction.
We now focus on the structure of prices and agents’ utilities induced by QCCEs with the
same vector of quantity constraints. In such a situation, buyers form their expectations
about trading opportunities in advance and then optimize their behavior.
Given prices p, p′ ∈ RT , we denote their component-wise minimum by p ∧ p′, so, for
every t ∈ T, (p ∧ p′)t = min{pt, p′t}. The component-wise maximum is denoted by p ∨ p′,
so, for every t ∈ T, (p ∨ p′)t = max{pt, p′t}. For two outcomes A,A′ ∈ A, we define A ∧ A′
and A ∨ A′ by
A ∧ A′ = (∪b∈B{Ab | U b(A) > U b(A′)}) ∪ (∪b∈B{(A′)b | U b(A) ≤ U b(A′)}),
A ∨ A′ = (∪b∈B{(A′)b | U b(A) > U b(A′)}) ∪ (∪b∈B{Ab | U b(A) ≤ U b(A′)}).
Theorem 5.12: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Let (p, q, A) and (p′, q, A′) be
QCCEs for E. Then (p ∧ p′, q, A ∧ A′) and (p ∨ p′, q, A ∨ A′) are QCCEs for E as well.
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Proof : See Appendix A.9. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5.12 shows two ways to derive a QCCE from two arbitrary QCCEs (p, q, A) and
(p′, q, A′) with the same vector of quantity constraints. In the first way we obtain the
QCCE (p∧p′, q, A∧A′) by setting the price of each trade as the component-wise minimum
price between the two QCCEs and assigning to each buyer the trade with the maximum
utility. In the second way, we generate the QCCE (p∨ p′, q, A∨A′) by setting the price of
each trade as the component-wise maximum price between the two QCCEs and assigning
to each buyer the trade with the minimum utility.
Given an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l) and a vector of quantity constraints q ∈ {0, 1}T ,
let
P (E , q) = {p ∈ RT | ∃A ∈ A such that (p, q, A) is a QCCE of E}
be the set of QCCE prices for a given q, and let
V B(E , q) = {(V b)b∈B ∈ RB | ∃(p,A) ∈ RT ×A s.t. (p, q, A) is a QCCE of E and V b = U b(A)},
V S(E , q) = {(V s)s∈S ∈ RS | ∃(p,A) ∈ RT ×A s.t. (p, q, A) is a QCCE of E and V s = U s(A)}
be the set of utilities generated by the QCCEs for a given q.
Theorem 5.12 implies that P (E , q), V B(E , q), and V S(E , q) are all lattices.3 However,
P (E , q), V B(E , q), and V S(E , q) may not be complete lattices. The reason that these lat-
tices may not be complete is not only caused by the possibility of unbounded prices as
allowed for by assumptions (b-i) and (s-i) of the utility functions. Indeed, in the absence
of financial constraints, if for each i ∈ B ∪ S and each t ∈ T i, the range of ui(t, ·) is all
of R, then P (E , q), V B(E , q), and V S(E , q) are all complete lattices (Demange and Gale,
1985). However, even if we impose this assumption in the presence of financial constraints,
the lattices P (E , q), V B(E , q), and V S(E , q) may not be complete, as exemplified below.
Example 5.13: Consider the economy as defined in Example 5.3. Let q = (0, 0). Then
P (E , q) = {(pt, pt′) ∈ R2 | pt, pt′ ∈ (2, 3] and pt ≤ pt′},
V B(E , q) = {(V b1 , V b2) ∈ R2 | V b1 = 0 and 1 ≤ V b2 < 2},
V S(E , q) = {V s1 ∈ R | 2 < V s1 ≤ 3}.
The lattices P (E , q), V B(E , q), and V S(E , q) are clearly not complete.
3The definitions of lattice and complete lattice correspond to the standard ones for matching models,
see, e.g., Kucuksenel (2011).
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If for each t ∈ T , qt = 0, then a QCCE is a competitive equilibrium. Thus, the lattice
structure of competitive equilibrium prices and agents’ utilities in the presence of financial
constraints can be also derived from Theorem 5.12.
Corollary 5.14: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Let q = (0, . . . , 0). Then
P (E , q), V B(E , q), and V S(E , q) are all lattices.
Theorem 5.12 and Corollary 5.14 involve equilibria with personalized prices. It is immediate
that the same results apply when prices are required to be buyer-uniform or seller-uniform.
For economies with commodities, the same results apply for the case of uniform prices.
In the assignment model with financial constraints described by Example 2.2, van der
Laan et al. (2018) show that the set of prices at which there is no overdemand forms
a lower-semi lattice. In such a model, Corollary 5.14 implies that the set of competitive
equilibrium prices is a lattice. The set of competitive equilibrium prices is strictly included
in the set of prices with no overdemand, so our result complements the one in van der Laan
et al. (2018).
5.5 Rural Hospital Theorem
Roth (1986) considers a many-to-one matching model and shows that all stable matchings
have the same set of matched doctors and hospitals. This invariance property of stable
matchings is known as the rural hospital theorem. The rural hospital theorem has been
extended in various directions, like matching models without constraints, e.g., Demange
and Gale (1985), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2010), matching
models with constraints, e.g., Kojima et al. (2018), and models of trading networks, e.g.,
Hatfield and Kominers (2012), Fleiner et al. (2018), and Schlegel (2019).
The next example shows that the rural hospital theorem fails in the presence of finan-
cial constraints.
Example 5.15: Let T = {t11, t12, t21, t22}, where tij denotes the trade such that β(tij) = bi
and σ(tij) = sj. Let l
b1
t11 = l
b1
t12 = 1 and l
b2
t21 = l
b2
t22 = 2. Utility functions are such that, for
every i ∈ B ∪S, ui(∅) = 0, ub1(t11,m) = 6−m, ub1(t12,m) = 1−m, ub2(t21,m) = 2.5−m,
ub2(t22,m) = 4−m, us1(t11,m) = us1(t21,m) = m−1, us2(t12,m) = m−1, and us2(t22,m) =
m. Let p = (pt11 , pt12 , pt21 , pt22) = (1, 1, 1, 2) and q = (qt11 , qt12 , qt21 , qt22) = (1, 0, 0, 0). Then
A = {(t22, 2)} is the only outcome such that (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
Let p′ = (p′t11 , p
′
t12
, p′t21 , p
′
t22
) = (1, 1.5, 0.5, 1.5) and q′ = (q′t11 , q
′
t12
, q′t21 , q
′
t22
) = (0, 1, 0, 0).
For outcome A′ = {(t11, 1), (t22, 1.5)}, it holds that (p′, q′, A′) is a QCCE. Next, we
show that there is no outcome A′′ such that (p′, q′, A′′) is a QCCE and τ(A′′) = {t22},
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which means a failure of the rural hospital theorem. Suppose A′′ is such that (p′, q′, A′′) is
a QCCE and τ(A′′) = {t22}. It follows that (A′′)b1 = ∅, so ∅ ∈ δb1(p′, q′). Since p′t11 = 1
and q′t11 = 0, it holds that δ
b1(p′, q′) = {{(t11, 1)}} and we have obtained a contradiction.
We now establish a version of the rural hospital theorem that holds for QCCEs with a
given vector of quantity constraints.
Theorem 5.16: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l). Let (p, q, A) be a QCCE for
E and p′ ∈ P (E , q). Then there is an outcome A′ ∈ A with β(τ(A′)) = β(τ(A)) and
σ(τ(A′)) = σ(τ(A)) such that (p′, q, A′) is a QCCE for E .
Proof : See Appendix A.10. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5.16 considers two arbitrary QCCEs with the same vector of quantity constraints.
It shows that there is a QCCE with the same set of agents signing contracts as in the
first QCCE and prices as given in the second QCCE. To prove Theorem 5.16, we first
use the QCCE (p, q, A) and prices p′ to construct a QCCE (p ∨ p′, q, A′′) such that the
sets of agents choosing the no-trade option are the same at (p, q, A) and (p ∨ p′, q, A′′),
i.e., B\β(τ(A)) = B\β(τ(A′′)) and S\σ(τ(A)) = S\σ(τ(A′′)). Then we use the QCCE
(p ∨ p′, q, A′′) and prices p′ to construct another QCCE ((p ∨ p′) ∧ p′, q, A′) such that
the sets of agents choosing the no-trade option are the same at those two QCCEs, i.e.,
B\β(τ(A′′)) = B\β(τ(A′)) and S\σ(τ(A′′)) = S\σ(τ(A′)). So we have B\β(τ(A)) =
B\β(τ(A′)) and S\σ(τ(A)) = S\σ(τ(A′)). The result now follows from observing that
(p ∨ p′) ∧ p′ = p′.
If for each t ∈ T, qt = 0, then a QCCE is a competitive equilibrium. Thus, the
rural hospital theorem of competitive equilibria can also be derived from Theorem 5.16.
Demange and Gale (1985) establish the rural hospital theorem of stable outcomes in the
matching model without financial constraints as described by Example 2.1. Notice that by
Theorem 5.1, their result is also a by-product of Theorem 5.16.
It is immediate that the appropriate analogues of Theorem 5.16 apply to QCCEs with
buyer-uniform prices, seller-uniform prices, and uniform prices.
6 Financial Constraints versus Price Controls
Matching markets with price controls are such that prices are restricted to be in between
price floors and price ceilings, e.g., Talman and Yang (2008), Andersson and Svensson
(2014), and Herings (2018). An important difference between price controls and financial
constraints is that price controls are generally publicly known, whereas financial constraints
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are often private information. As a consequence of this difference, there is a constrained
efficient and strategy-proof mechanism in the assignment model with price controls, see,
e.g., Andersson and Svensson (2014), whereas in the assignment model with financial con-
straints such a mechanism does not exist, see, e.g., Dobzinski et al. (2012).
In the following, we elaborate on the connection between matching markets with fi-
nancial constraints and those with price controls. We first introduce a special case of the
model with price controls as introduced in Herings (2018), where only price ceilings are
allowed. For each t ∈ T , let pt ∈ R+ be a price ceiling for the price of trade t. Let
p = (pt)t∈T ∈ RT+ be a vector of price ceilings. A matching model with price controls is
described by E = (B, S, T, u, p).
The set of feasible contracts is given by Y
p
= {(t,m) ∈ T × R | m ≤ pt}. Let Ap be
the collection of outcomes resulting from Y
p
.
The budget set and the demand set of buyer b ∈ B at (p, q) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T are given
by
γb(p, q) = {{c} ∈ Ap | τ(c) ∈ T b, µ(c) = pτ(c), and qτ(c) = 0} ∪ {∅}.
δ
b
(p, q) = arg max
Ab∈γb(p,q)
U b(Ab).
The budget set and the demand set of seller s ∈ S at p ∈ RT are given by
γs(p) = {{c} ∈ Ap | τ(c) ∈ T s and µ(c) = pτ(c)} ∪ {∅}.
δ
s
(p) = arg max
As∈γs(p)
U s(As).
Definition 6.1 (Herings, 2018): An element (p, q, A) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T × Ap is a Dre`ze
equilibrium (DE) for the economy E = (B, S, T, u, p) if:
(i) For each b ∈ B, Ab ∈ δb(p, q).
(ii) For each s ∈ S, As ∈ δs(p).
(iii) For each t ∈ T, pt ≤ pt.
(iv) For each t ∈ T , if pt < pt, then qt = 0.
We now convert an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l) with financial constraints into an economy
E = (B, S, T, u, p) with price ceilings by setting, for every t ∈ T, pt = lβ(t)t . We call E the
economy with price ceilings associated to E . Since Y = {(t,m) ∈ T × R | m ≤ lβ(t)t } and
Y
p
= {(t,m) ∈ T × R | m ≤ pt}, it holds that Y = Y p. It follows that A = Ap and
ASO(E) = ASO(E). Let
ADE(E) = {A ∈ Ap | there is (p, q) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T such that (p, q, A) is a DE}.
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Corollary 6.4 in Herings (2018) states the equivalence between ASO(E) and ADE(E). Com-
bining this with Theorem 5.1, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 6.2: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l) and let E be the associated econ-
omy with price ceilings. It holds that AQCCE(E) = ASO(E) = ASO(E) = ADE(E) 6= ∅.
However, a QCCE of E is not necessarily a DE of the associated economy with price ceil-
ings E , because the price of a trade t in a QCCE (p, q, A) can exceed buyer β(t)’s financial
constraint on t, i.e., pt > l
β(t)
t = pt, which violates Condition (iii) of Definition 6.1.
A vector of quantity constraints that is compatible with a QCCE may not be compati-
ble with a DE as is demonstrated in the next example. In this example, the QCCE is such
that there are no quantity constraints, so it is a competitive equilibrium.
Example 6.3: We take the same primitives as in Example 5.3. Let price ceilings be given
by pt = l
b1
t = 2 and pt′ = l
b2
t′ = 3. It is easily verified that (p, q, A) with p = (pt, pt′) = (3, 3),
q = (qt, qt′) = (0, 0), and A = {(t′, 3)} is a QCCE. In fact, it is a competitive equilibrium
with uniform prices. It is not a DE since pt = 3 > 2 = pt. In fact, it is easily seen that
there is no DE with q = (0, 0). At any prices (pt, pt′) ≤ (2, 3) = (pt, pt′), it holds that
δb1(p, (0, 0)) = {{(t, pt)}} and δb2(p, (0, 0)) = {{(t′, pt′)}}. Since the seller can supply at
most one unit, a DE with q = (0, 0) does not exist.
The next result states that DEs are a refinement of QCCEs.
Theorem 6.4: Consider an economy E = (B, S, T, u, l) and let E be the associated econ-
omy with price ceilings. If (p, q, A) is a DE for E , then (p, q, A) is a QCCE for E .
Proof : See Appendix A.11. Q.E.D.
If we fix a vector of quantity constraints and assume that the agents’ utility functions
satisfy the finiteness assumption imposed by Demange and Gale (1985), see Example 2.1,
then the sets of prices and utilities at DEs with that vector of quantity constraints are
complete lattices. As shown in Example 5.13, this is not the case for QCCEs.
Similar to matching markets with financial constraints, the rural hospital theorem fails
to hold for matching markets with price controls. But for DEs with the same vector of
quantity constraints, a result parallel to Theorem 5.16 can still be established.
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7 Concluding Remarks
We show how to conduct the competitive analysis in the one-to-one matching with contracts
model when there are financial constraints. In such a model, although a stable outcome
always exists, there is in general no competitive equilibrium as defined in the standard way.
We argue that in some cases buyers should be allowed to hold expectations that there is
no supply of certain trades. This may occur exactly when the price of the trade is equal to
the financial constraint or above. At our equilibrium notion, called quantity-constrained
competitive equilibium (QCCE), such expectations are confirmed and thereby rational.
We show that a QCCE always exists.
We analyze the properties of QCCEs from a number of perspectives. First, we establish
the equivalence between the set of stable outcomes and the set of QCCE outcomes. Second,
we show the equivalence between the core and the set of QCCE outcomes. Third, we present
sufficient conditions to guarantee the existence of QCCEs with buyer-uniform prices, seller-
uniform prices, and uniform prices. Fourth, we show that given a fixed vector of quantity
constraints, the sets of prices and agents’ utilities induced by QCCEs with that vector of
quantity constraints are lattices, though not necessarily complete ones. Fifth, we show that
given a fixed vector of quantity constraints, the rural hospital theorem holds for QCCEs
with that vector of quantity constraints.
We also discuss the relation between economies with financial constraints and those with
price controls. We associate to each economy with financial constraints a corresponding
economy with price controls. The standard equilibrium notion for the economy with price
controls is the Dre`ze equilibrium (DE). We show that the set of QCCE outcomes of an
economy is equivalent to the set of DE outcomes of the associated economy with price
controls. However, QCCE prices and quantity constraints may not be DE prices and
quantity constraints. The set of DEs is a subset of the set of QCCEs, where the inclusion
can be strict.
Throughout the paper, we focus on the situation where only buyers face financial con-
straints. The equilibrium concept of QCCE and the results of this paper can also be
extended to the case where sellers face financial constraints or both buyers and sellers face
financial constraints.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3
We prove Lemma 3.3 in four steps.
Step 1: There is K ≥ 0 such that AK+1 = ZK , i.e., the adjustment process terminates in
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a finite number of steps.
Suppose not. Then, for every k ≥ 0, it holds that Ak+1 ( Zk and therefore Y k+1 ( Y k.
Since Y 0 = Y
ε
and Y
ε
is finite, this leads to a contradiction.
Step 2: AK+1 is an outcome.
For each i ∈ β(τ(AK+1)) ∪ σ(τ(AK+1)), it holds that ∣∣(AK+1)i∣∣ = 1. For each i ∈
(B ∪ S)\(β(τ(AK+1)) ∪ σ(τ(AK+1))), it holds that ∣∣(AK+1)i∣∣ = 0.
Step 3: Condition (i) of Definition 3.1 for Y
ε
holds at AK+1, i.e., for each i ∈ B ∪ S,
(AK+1)i ∈ Chi(AK+1).
For each i ∈ (B∪S)\(β(AK+1)∪σ(AK+1)), since ∣∣(AK+1)i∣∣ = 0 it holds that (AK+1)i =
∅ ∈ Chi(AK+1). For each b ∈ β(AK+1), since buyer b has chosen (AK+1)b, it holds that
U b(AK+1) ≥ U b(∅), so (AK+1)b ∈ Chb(AK+1). For each s ∈ σ(AK+1), since seller s accepts
(AK+1)s, it holds that U s(AK+1) ≥ U s(∅), so (AK+1)s ∈ Chs(AK+1).
Step 4: Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1 for Y
ε
holds at AK+1, i.e., there is no c = (t,m) ∈
Y
ε
such that Uβ(t)({c}) > Uβ(t)(AK+1) and Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(AK+1).
By contradiction, suppose that there is c = (t,m) ∈ Y ε such that Uβ(t)({c}) >
Uβ(t)(AK+1) and Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(AK+1). Since Uβ(t)({c}) > Uβ(t)(AK+1), there is
k < K such that β(t) chooses {c}, but {c} is rejected by σ(t). This implies Uσ(t)(Ak+1) ≥
Uσ(t)({c}). Since the welfare of seller σ(t) is non-decreasing, it follows that Uσ(t)(AK+1) ≥
Uσ(t)({c}), contradicting Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(AK+1). Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Take some ε > 0 and let (εn)n∈Z+ be the sequence such that εn = ε/2n. It holds that
εn → 0 as n→ +∞. By Lemma 3.3, for each εn > 0, there is a stable outcome Aεn for Y εn .
Since the set of trades is finite, there is a subsequence (ε′n)n∈Z+ of (εn)n∈Z+ such that the
set of trades τ(Aε
′
n) does not depend on ε′n. We denote this set of trades by T
′. Consider
the following two cases.
Case 1: T ′ = ∅.
We show that A = ∅ is a stable outcome for Y .
For each i ∈ B ∪ S, it holds that Ai = ∅. Thus A is an outcome. For each i ∈ B ∪ S,
it holds that Ai = ∅ ∈ Chi(∅), so Condition (i) of Definition 3.1 holds.
To show Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1 holds, by contradiction, suppose that there is
c = (t,m) ∈ Y such that Uβ(t)({c}) > Uβ(t)(∅) and Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(∅). For sufficiently
small ε′n, there is c
′ = (t,m′) ∈ Y ε′n such that Uβ(t)({c′}) > Uβ(t)(∅) and Uσ(t)({c′}) >
Uσ(t)(∅). Thus Uβ(t)({c′}) > Uβ(t)(∅) = Uβ(t)(Aε′n) and Uσ(t)({c′}) > Uσ(t)(∅) = Uσ(t)(Aε′n),
contradicting that Aε
′
n is a stable outcome for Y
ε′n .
Case 2: T ′ 6= ∅.
Let a trade t ∈ T ′ be given. Let b = β(t) and s = σ(t). The bounds mst and mbt are such
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that, for every n ∈ Z+, for cn ∈ Aε′n with τ(cn) = t it holds that mst ≤ µ(cn) ≤ mbt . Since
the set T ′ is finite and monetary payments are uniformly bounded, the sequence (Aε
′
n)n∈Z+
has a convergent subsequence (Aε
′′
n)n∈Z+ with limit A.
For every (t,m) ∈ A it holds that mσ(t)t ≤ m ≤ mβ(t)t .
We show that A is a stable outcome for Y .
Since, for every n ∈ Z+, Aε′′n is an outcome, it follows that A is an outcome. It is
straightforward that for each i ∈ B ∪ S such that Ai = ∅, Ai ∈ Chi(A). In the following,
we show that for each i ∈ B∪S such that Ai 6= ∅, Ai ∈ Chi(A). By contradiction, suppose
that there is i ∈ B ∪ S such that Ai 6= ∅ and Ai /∈ Chi(A). Then U i(∅) > U i(A). Then,
by selecting a sufficiently large n, it holds that U i(∅) > U i(Aε′′n), contradicting that Aε′′n is
a stable outcome for Y
ε′′n . Thus, Condition (i) of Definition 3.1 holds.
To show that Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1 holds, by contradiction, suppose that
there is c = (t,m) ∈ Y such that Uβ(t)({c}) > Uβ(t)(A) and Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(A). For
n sufficiently large, there is c′ = (t,m′) ∈ Y ε′′n such that Uβ(t)({c′}) > Uβ(t)(Aε′′n) and
Uσ(t)({c′}) > Uσ(t)(Aε′′n), contradicting that Aε′′n is a stable outcome for Y ε′′n .
Consequently, A is a stable outcome for Y . Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
For every b ∈ B, for every t ∈ T b, recall that mbt ∈ R satisfies ub(t,mbt) ≤ ub(∅).
Moreover, we have mbt = min{lbt ,mbt}. For every b ∈ B, for every t ∈ T b, one of the
following three cases holds:
(b− 1) For every m ∈ R, U b(A) > ub(t,m).
(b− 2) For some m′ ≤ mbt , U b(A) = ub(t,m′).
(b− 3) lbt < mbt and U b(A) < ub(t, lbt).
For every s ∈ S, for every t ∈ T s, recall that mst ∈ R satisfies us(t,mst) ≤ us(∅). Since
A is a stable outcome it follows by Condition (i) of Definition 3.1 that U s(A) ≥ us(∅) ≥
us(t,mst).
For every s ∈ S, for every t ∈ T s, one of the following two cases holds:
(s− 1) For every m ∈ R, U s(A) > us(t,m).
(s− 2) For some m′′ ≥ mst , U s(A) = us(t,m′′).
Step 1: Let t ∈ T, b = β(t), and s = σ(t). We first show statements (i) and (ii): (i)
If lbt < m
b
t , U
b(A) < ub(t, lbt), and there is some m
′′ ≥ mst such that U s(A) = us(t,m′′),
then m′′ ≥ lbt . (ii) If there are m′,m′′ ∈ R such that m′ ≤ mbt , U b(A) = ub(t,m′) and
U s(A) = us(t,m′′), then m′ ≤ m′′.
For (i), by contradiction, suppose that m′′ < lbt . Define m = (m
′′ + lbt)/2 and consider
the contract c = (t,m) ∈ Y . Then from m′′ < lbt it follows that m′′ < m and lbt > m.
We have that U b(A) < ub(t, lbt) < u
b(t,m) and U s(A) = us(t,m′′) < us(t,m), thereby
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contradicting that A satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1.
For (ii), by contradiction, suppose that m′ > m′′. Define m = (m′+m′′)/2 and consider
the contract c = (t,m) ∈ Y . Then from m′ > m′′, it follows that m′ > m and m′′ < m. We
have that U b(A) = ub(t,m′) < ub(t,m) and U s(A) = us(t,m′′) < us(t,m), contradicting
that A satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1.
Step 2: The construction of (p, q) ∈ RT × {0, 1}T .
For each c = (t,m) ∈ A, we define pt = m and qt = 0. For every t ∈ T \ τ(A), we define
p and q as in Table 1.
Table 1 Construction of (pt, qt) for t ∈ T \ τ(A).
(s− 1) (s− 2)
(b− 1) pt = 0, qt = 0 pt = m′′, qt = 0
(b− 2) pt = m′, qt = 0 pt = m′′, qt = 0
(b− 3) pt = lbt , qt = 1 pt = lbt , qt = 1
Step 3: (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
Let some b ∈ B be given. Consider t ∈ T b such that qt = 0. We are either in Case
(b− 1) or in Case (b− 2). If (b− 1) occurs, it is obvious that U b(A) > ub(t, pt). If (b− 2)
occurs, by (s− 1) and statement (ii) of Step 1 for (s− 2), we have that U b(A) ≥ ub(t, pt).
We conclude that Ab ∈ δb(p, q), so Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds.
Let some s ∈ S be given. Consider t ∈ T s. If (s − 1) occurs, then it is obvious that
U s(A) > us(t, pt). If (s−2) occurs, by (b−1), (b−2), and statement (i) of Step 1 for (b−3),
we have that U s(A) ≥ us(t, pt). Thus, As ∈ δs(p) and so Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1
holds.
For each t ∈ T such that qt = 1, by Table 1, pt = lβ(t)t , so Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1
holds.
We have shown that (p, q, A) is a QCCE. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proposition 4.3 implies ASO(E) ⊆ AQCCE(E). In the following, we show AQCCE(E) ⊆
ASO(E). Let A ∈ AQCCE(E) and let (p, q, A) be a QCCE for E . Evidently, A is an outcome.
The following shows that A is stable.
Step 1: A satisfies Condition (i) of Definition 3.1.
For each i ∈ B ∪ S such that Ai = ∅, it is straightforward that Ai ∈ Chi(A).
For each i ∈ B ∪ S such that Ai 6= ∅, to show Ai ∈ Chi(A), by contradiction, suppose
there is some i ∈ B ∪ S such that Ai /∈ Chi(A), so U i(A) < U i(∅). If i ∈ B then it follows
that Ai /∈ δb(p, q) and if i ∈ S it follows that Ai /∈ δs(p), contradicting that (p, q, A) is a
QCCE. Consequently, for each i ∈ B ∪ S such that Ai 6= ∅, it holds that Ai ∈ Chi(A).
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Step 2: A satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1.
By contradiction, suppose there is c = (t,m) ∈ Y such that Uβ(t)({c}) > Uβ(t)(A) and
Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(A).
Case 1: m ≥ pt.
Then uβ(t)(t, pt) ≥ uβ(t)(t,m) = Uβ(t)({c}) > Uβ(t)(A). By Condition (i) of Defini-
tion 4.1, it holds that Aβ(t) ∈ δβ(t)(p, q), so qt = 1. By Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1, it
follows that pt ≥ lβ(t)t . Since (t,m) ∈ Y , we have that m ≤ lβ(t)t and so pt = lβ(t)t = m.
It follows that {c} ∈ γs(p). By Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(A), we have that Aσ(t) /∈ δσ(t)(p), a
contradiction to Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1.
Case 2: m < pt.
It holds that Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(A) ≥ uσ(t)(t, pt), so m > pt, a contradiction.
Consequently, A satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.5
We only need to show that C(E) = ASO(E). It then follows by Proposition 3.4 and
Theorem 5.1 that C(E) = AQCCE(E) 6= ∅.
Step 1: For each A ∈ ASO(E), A ∈ C(E).
By contradiction, suppose that there is A ∈ ASO(E) such that A /∈ C(E). Then there is
A′ ∈ A and N ⊆ B ∪ S such that:
(i) For every i ∈ (B ∪ S)\N, (A′)i = ∅.
(ii) For every j ∈ N, U j(A′) > U j(A).
By (ii) and since A is a stable outcome, for each j ∈ N, U j(A′) > U j(A) ≥ U j(∅) and
so (A′)j 6= ∅. Let k be the trading partner of j in A′. By (i) it holds that k /∈ (B∪S)\N, so
k ∈ N, and therefore Uk(A′) > Uk(A). Thus, Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1 is violated,
contradicting that A ∈ ASO(E).
Step 2: For each A ∈ C(E), A ∈ ASO(E).
By contradiction, suppose that there is A ∈ C(E) such that A /∈ ASO(E).
Case 1: Condition (i) of Definition 3.1 is violated.
Then there is i ∈ B ∪ S such that U i(∅) > U i(A). Take A′ = ∅ and N = {i}. Then
U i(A′) > U i(A) implies that A /∈ C(E), a contradiction.
Case 2: Condition (ii) of Definition 3.1 is violated.
Then there is c = (t,m) ∈ Y such that Uβ(t)({c}) > Uβ(t)(A) and Uσ(t)({c}) > Uσ(t)(A).
Take A′ = {c} and N = {β(t), σ(t)}. Now Uβ(t)(A′) > Uβ(t)(A) and Uσ(t)(A′) > Uσ(t)(A)
imply that A /∈ C(E), a contradiction. Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5.7
By Corollary 4.4, a QCCE exists. Let (p,Q,A) be a QCCE and let I1 ∈ T S be a set
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of s1-equivalent trades. We construct a QCCE (p
1, q1, A1) such that, for every t, t′ ∈ I1,
p1t = p
1
t′ and, for every t ∈ T \I1, p1t = pt. Then, using the same reasoning, given (p1, q1, A1)
and I2 ∈ T S \{I1}, we can derive a QCCE (p2, q2, A2) such that, for every t, t′ ∈ I2, p2t = p2t′
and, for every t ∈ T \ I2, p2t = p1t , and so on. Since T S contains finitely many, say k, sets,
it follows that (pk, qk, Ak) is a QCCE that meets the requirements of Proposition 5.7.
We define (p1, q1, A1) as follows:
(i) For every t′ ∈ I1, p1t′ = maxt∈I1 pt and, for every t ∈ T\I1, p1t = pt.
(ii) q1 = q.
(iii) A1 = A.
To show that (p1, q1, A1) is a QCCE, we show first that, for every (t,m) ∈ A1, p1t = m.
Suppose not. Then there is (t′,m′) ∈ A1 such that t′ ∈ I1 and p1t′ > m′ = pt′ . Let t ∈ I1
be such that p1t′ = pt. It holds that {(t, pt)} ∈ γs1(p). Since us1(t, ·) = us1(t′, ·) and pt >
pt′ , it follows that U
s1({(t, pt)}) > U s1({(t′, pt′)}), a contradiction to {(t′, pt′)} ∈ δs1(p).
Consequently, for every (t,m) ∈ A1, p1t = m, so p1t = pt, {(t,m)} ∈ γβ(t)(p1, q1), and
{(t,m)} ∈ γσ(t)(p1).
We show next that (p1, q1, A1) satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.1.
Step 1: Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds for each b ∈ B.
Let some b ∈ B be given. It holds that (A1)b = Ab ∈ γb(p1, q1). For every t ∈ T b, since
p1t ≥ pt and q1 = q, it holds that (A1)b ∈ δb(p1, q1). Thus Condition (i) of Definition 4.1
holds for each b ∈ B.
We continue by showing that (p1, q1, A1) satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1.
Step 2: Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds for each s ∈ S.
For each s ∈ S\{s1}, since (A1)s = As and, for each t ∈ T s, p1t = pt, As ∈ δs(p) implies
(A1)s ∈ δs(p1). Thus Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds for every s ∈ S \ {s1}.
To show that s1 satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition (4.1), we distinguish two cases.
Case 1: As1 = ∅. It holds that, for every t ∈ I1, U s1(∅) ≥ us1(t, pt). Using the fact that I1 is
a set of s1-equivalent trades, it follows that, for every t ∈ I1, U s1(∅) ≥ us1(t,maxt′∈I1 pt′) =
us1(t, p1t ). For each t ∈ T s1\I1, it holds that p1t = pt, so U s1(∅) ≥ us1(t, p1t ). Thus Condition
(ii) of Definition 4.1 holds for s1.
Case 2: As1 6= ∅. It holds that, for every t ∈ I1, U s1(A) ≥ us1(t, pt). Using the fact that
I1 is a set of s1-equivalent trades, it follows that, for every t ∈ I1, U s1(A) ≥ us1(t, p1t ). For
each t ∈ T s1\I1, it holds that p1t = pt, so U s1(A) ≥ us1(t,maxt′∈I1 pt′) = us1(t, p1t ). Since
A1 = A, we find that Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds for s1.
Step 3: It is easily seen that (p1, q1, A1) satisfies Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1.
Consequently, (p1, q1, A1) is a QCCE. Q.E.D.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5.8
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By Corollary 4.4, a QCCE exists. Let (p, q, A) be a QCCE and let I1 ∈ T B be a set of
b1-equivalent trades. We derive a QCCE (p
1, q1, A1) such that, for every t, t′ ∈ I1, p1t = p1t′
and, for every t ∈ T \ I1, p1t = pt. Then, using the same reasoning, given (p1, q1, A1) and
I2 ∈ T B \ I1, we can derive a QCCE (p2, q2, A2) such that, for every t, t′ ∈ I2, p2t = p2t′ and,
for every t ∈ T \ I2, p2t = p1t , and so on. Since T B contains finitely many, say k, sets, it
follows that (pk, qk, Ak) is a QCCE that meets the requirements of Proposition 5.8.
We define (p1, q1, A1) as follows.
(i) For every t′ ∈ I1, p1t′ = mint∈I1 pt and, for every t ∈ T\I1, p1t = pt.
(ii) For every t ∈ I1 such that pt > lb1t and p1t = lb1t , q1t = 1. For every t ∈ I1 such that
qt = 1 and p
1
t < l
b1
t , q
1
t = 0. Otherwise, q
1
t = qt.
(iii) A1 = A.
To show that (p1, q1, A1) is a QCCE, we show first that, for every (t,m) ∈ A1, p1t = m.
Suppose not. Then there is (t′,m′) ∈ A1 such that t′ ∈ I1 and p1t′ < m′ = pt′ . Let
t ∈ I1 be such that p1t′ = pt. Since (t′, pt′) ∈ A and I1 is a set of b1-equivalent trades,
it holds that pt′ ≤ lb1t′ = lb1t , so pt < lb1t and qt = 0. It follows that {(t, pt)} ∈ γb1(p, q).
Since ub1(t, ·) = ub1(t′, ·) and pt < pt′ , it follows that U b1({(t, pt)}) > U b1({(t′, pt′)}), a
contradiction to {(t′, pt′)} ∈ δb1(p, q). Consequently, for every (t,m) ∈ A1, p1t = m, so
p1t = pt, q
1
t = qt, {(t,m)} ∈ γβ(t)(p1, q1), and {(t,m)} ∈ γσ(t)(p1).
We show next that (p1, q1, A1) satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.1.
Step 1: Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds for each b ∈ B.
For every b ∈ B\{b1}, for every t ∈ T b, p1t = pt and q1t = qt, so (A1)b = Ab ∈ δb(p, q) =
δb(p1, q1).
To show that b1 satisfies Condition (i) of Definition 4.1, we distinguish three cases.
Case 1: τ(Ab1)∩I1 6= ∅. Denote the element in τ(Ab1)∩I1 by t′. We have already shown that
p1t′ = pt′ = mint∈I1 pt, so, for every t ∈ I1, U b1(A) ≥ ub1(t, p1t ). Since for every t ∈ T b1\I1,
p1t = pt and q
1
t = qt, we have (A
1)b1 = Ab1 ∈ δb1(p1, q1).
Case 2: τ(Ab1) ∩ I1 = ∅ and there is t ∈ I1 such that {(t, pt)} ∈ γb1(p, q). For ev-
ery t ∈ I1 such that {(t, pt)} ∈ γb1(p, q), it holds that U b1(A) ≥ ub1(t, pt). Let m =
min{t∈I1|{(t,pt)}∈γb1 (p,q)} pt. Since I1 is a set of b1-equivalent trades, we have, for every t ∈ I1
such that {(t, pt)} ∈ γb1(p, q), U b1(A) ≥ ub1(t,m). For every t ∈ I1 such that {(t, pt)} /∈
γb1(p, q), we have pt ≥ lb1t ≥ m. It follows that m = mint∈I1 pt = p1t , so, for every
t ∈ I1, U b1(A) ≥ ub1(t, p1t ). Since for each t ∈ T b1\I1, p1t = pt and q1t = qt, it holds that
(A1)b1 = Ab1 ∈ δb1(p1, q1).
Case 3: τ(Ab1) ∩ I1 = ∅ and, for every t ∈ I1, {(t, pt)} /∈ γb1(p, q). It holds that, for every
t ∈ I1, pt ≥ lb1t . If for each t ∈ I1, pt > lb1t , then since I1 is a set of b1-equivalent trades,
we have, for every t′ ∈ I1, pt′ = mint∈I1 pt > lb1t′ . Since, for every t ∈ T b1\I1, p1t = pt and
q1t = qt, it follows that (A
1)b1 = Ab1 ∈ δb1(p1, q1).
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If there is t ∈ I1 such that pt = lb1t , then it follows from {(t, pt)} /∈ γb1(p, q) that
qt = 1. Since I1 is a set of b1-equivalent trades, it follows that l
b1
t = mint∈I1 pt. Note that,
for every t ∈ I1, if pt > lb1t and p1t = lb1t , then q1t = 1. Thus, for every t ∈ I1, it holds
that {(t, p1t )} /∈ γb1(p1, q1). Since for each t ∈ T b1\I1, p1t = pt and q1t = qt, we have that
(A1)b1 = Ab1 ∈ δb1(p1, q1).
Step 2: Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds for each s ∈ S.
Since, for every s ∈ S, As ∈ γs(p1) and p1 ≤ p, we have that As ∈ δs(p1).
Step 3: It is easily seen that (p1, q1, A1) satisfies Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1.
Consequently, (p1, q1, A1) is a QCCE. Q.E.D.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 5.10
For every b ∈ B, for every ` ∈ L, define Ib,` = {b} × S × {`}. It holds that all trades
in Ib,` are b-equivalent. By Proposition 5.8, there is a QCCE (p, q, A) with buyer-uniform
prices, so for every t, t′ ∈ Ib,` it holds that pt = pt′ . We denote this price by pb,`. Next, for
every ` ∈ L, we define p` = maxb∈B pb,`. Let p ∈ RT be defined by
pt = pλ(t), t ∈ T.
We argue that (p, q, A) is a QCCE with uniform prices.
To show that (p, q, A) is a QCCE, we show first that, for every (t,m) ∈ A, pt = m.
Suppose not. Then there is (t′,m′) = ((b′, s′, `′),m′) ∈ A such that pt′ > m′ = pt′ . Let
b ∈ B be such that pt′ = pb,`′ . Since the prices p are buyer-uniform, for t = (b, s′, `′) it holds
that pt = pt′ > pt′ . It holds that {(t, pt)} ∈ γs′(p) and U s′({(t, pt)}) > U s′({(t′, pt′)}), a
contradiction to {(t′, pt′)} ∈ δs′(p). Consequently, for every (t,m) ∈ A, pt = m, so pt = pt,
{(t,m)} ∈ γβ(t)(p, q), and {(t,m)} ∈ γσ(t)(p).
We show next that (p, q, A) satisfies Condition (i) of Definition 4.1. Let some b ∈ B be
given. We have already shown that Ab ∈ γb(p, q). Since Ab ∈ δb(p, q) and p ≥ p, it follows
that Ab ∈ δb(p, q).
We show next that (p, q, A) satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1. Let some s ∈ S be
given. We have already shown that As ∈ γs(p). From As ∈ δs(p), it follows that U s(As) ≥
U s(∅). Suppose there is {(t, pt)} ∈ γs(p) such that us(t, pt) > U s(A). From As ∈ δs(p), it
follows that pt > pt. Let b ∈ B be such that pt = p(b,s,λ(t)). Then us((b, s, λ(t)), p(b,s,λ(t))) =
us(t, pt) > U
s(As), a contradiction to As ∈ δs(p). Consequently, it holds that As ∈ δs(p).
We complete the proof by showing that (p, q, A) satisfies Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1.
This follows easily from the fact that (p, q, A) satisfies Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1 and
p ≥ p. Q.E.D.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 5.12
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Let B1, B2, and B3 be a partition of B such that
B1 = {b ∈ B : U b(A) > U b(A′)},
B2 = {b ∈ B : U b(A′) > U b(A)},
B3 = {b ∈ B : U b(A) = U b(A′)}.
Let S1, S2, and S3 be a partition of S such that
S1 = {s ∈ S : U s(A′) > U s(A)},
S2 = {s ∈ S : U s(A) > U s(A′)},
S3 = {s ∈ S : U s(A) = U s(A′)}.
Let some b ∈ B1 be given. We have that U b(A) > U b(A′), so Ab 6= ∅. Let t be the trade
corresponding to Ab and s = σ(t). We show that s ∈ S1 by distinguishing two cases.
Case 1: {(t, p′t)} ∈ γb(p′, q). It holds by U b(A) > U b(A′) that pt < p′t. Since U s(A′) ≥
us(t, p′t), it holds that U
s(A′) > us(t, pt) = U s(A), so s ∈ S1.
Case 2: {(t, p′t)} /∈ γb(p′, q). Since q remains the same at the two QCCEs, it holds that
p′t > l
b
t and pt ≤ lbt . Since U s(A′) ≥ us(t, p′t), it follows that U s(A′) > us(t, pt) = U s(A), so
s ∈ S1.
We conclude that |B1| ≤ |S1| .
Let some s ∈ S1 be given. We have that U s(A′) > U s(A), so (A′)s 6= ∅. Let t be the
trade related to (A′)s and b = β(t). Since us(t, p′t) = U
s(A′) > U s(A) ≥ us(t, pt), we have
that p′t > pt. From {(t, p′t)} ∈ γb(p′, q) and p′t > pt, it follows that {(t, pt)} ∈ γb(p, q).
Thus, we have U b(A) ≥ ub(t, pt) > ub(t, p′t) = U b(A′), so b ∈ B1.
The result of the previous paragraph implies that |S1| ≤ |B1|. Together with |B1| ≤ |S1|,
this implies that |B1| = |S1|. Moreover, it is easily seen that agents in B1 are matched
with agents in S1 at two QCCEs. A similar argument can be used to show that |B2| = |S2|
and agents in B2 are matched with agents in S2 at the two QCCEs.
By the above analysis, for every b ∈ B1 and t ∈ τ(Ab), for every b′ ∈ B2 ∪ B3 and
t′ ∈ τ((A′)b′), it holds that σ(t) 6= σ(t′). Since A is an outcome, it holds that, for every
b ∈ B1 and t ∈ τ(Ab), for every b′ ∈ B1 and t′ ∈ τ(Ab′), b 6= b′ implies σ(t) 6= σ(t′). Since A′
is an outcome, it holds that, for every b ∈ B2 ∪B3 and t ∈ τ((A′)b), for every b′ ∈ B2 ∪B3
and t′ ∈ τ((A′)b′), b 6= b′ implies σ(t) 6= σ(t′). It follows that A ∧ A′ is an outcome. By a
similar argument it can be shown that A ∨ A′ is an outcome.
Denote p ∧ p′ by p and A ∧ A′ by A. We show next that (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
Step 1: Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds.
Let some b ∈ B1 be given. It holds that Ab = Ab. Since U b(A) > U b(A′), it follows
that Ab 6= ∅. Let (t,m) ∈ T × R be such that Ab = {(t,m)}. From U b(A) > U b(A′) and
the analysis of Cases 1 and 2 above, it follows that p
t
= pt < p
′
t. Since A
b ∈ γb(p, q), it
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holds that m = pt, so A
b ∈ γb(p, q). Obviously, it is true that U b(A) ≥ U b(∅). For every
{c} ∈ γb(p, q) such that µ(c) = pτ(c), it holds that {c} ∈ γb(p, q), so ub(c) ≤ U b(A). For
every {c} ∈ γb(p, q) such that µ(c) = p′τ(c), it holds that {c} ∈ γb(p′, q), so ub(c) ≤ U b(A′) <
U b(A). Thus Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds for every b ∈ B1.
Let some b ∈ B2 ∪ B3 be given. It holds that Ab = (A′)b. If (A′)b = ∅, then clearly
(A′)b ∈ γb(p, q). Otherwise, let (t,m) ∈ T × R be such that (A′)b = {(t,m)}. Since b is
matched with some σ(t) ∈ S2 ∪ S3 and by Uσ(t)(A′) ≤ Uσ(t)(A), it holds that pt = p′t ≤ pt.
Since (A′)b ∈ γb(p′, q), it holds that m = p′t, so (A′)b ∈ γb(p, q). Obviously, it is true that
U b(A′) ≥ U b(∅). For every {c} ∈ γb(p, q) such that µ(c) = pτ(c), it holds that {c} ∈ γb(p, q),
so ub(c) ≤ U b(A) ≤ U b(A′). For every {c} ∈ γb(p, q) such that µ(c) = p′τ(c), it holds that
{c} ∈ γb(p′, q), so ub(c) ≤ U b(A′). Thus Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds for every
b ∈ B2 ∪B3.
Step 2: Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds.
Let some s ∈ S1 be given. By the first part of the proof it holds that there is t ∈ τ(A)
such that σ(t) = s and β(t) ∈ B1. We have that As = As. Moreover, from U s(A′) > U s(A),
it follows that p
t
= pt < p
′
t, so A
s ∈ γs(p). Obviously, it is true that U s(A) ≥ U s(∅). For
every {c} ∈ γs(p), since As ∈ δs(p) and p
τ(c)
≤ pτ(c), we have that U s(A) ≥ us(c). It follows
that Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds for every s ∈ S1.
Let some s ∈ S2 ∪ S3 be given. By the first part of the proof it holds that As = (A′)s.
If (A′)s = ∅, then clearly (A′)s ∈ γs(p). Otherwise, there is (t,m) ∈ Y such that (A′)s =
{(t,m)}. From U s(A) ≥ U s(A′), it follows that p
t
= p′t ≤ pt, so (A′)s ∈ γs(p). Obviously,
it is true that U s(A′) ≥ U s(∅). For every {c} ∈ γs(p), since (A′)s ∈ δs(p′) and p
τ(c)
≤ p′τ(c),
we have that U s(A′) ≥ us(c). It follows that Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds for every
s ∈ S2 ∪ S3.
Step 3: Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1 holds.
For each t ∈ T, if p
t
< l
β(t)
t , then pt < l
β(t)
t or p
′
t < l
β(t)
t , so since both (p, q, A) and
(p′, q, A′) are QCCEs, it follows that qt = 0.
We conclude that (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
Denote p ∨ p′ by p and A ∨ A′ by A.
We show next that (p, q, A) is a QCCE.
Step 1: Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds.
Let some b ∈ B1 be given. It holds that Ab = (A′)b. Let (t,m) ∈ Y be such that
(A′)b = {(t,m)}. Since b is matched with some σ(t) ∈ S1 and by Uσ(t)(A) < Uσ(t)(A′), it
follows that pt < p
′
t = pt. The fact that (A
′)b ∈ γb(p′, q) now implies that (A′)b ∈ γb(p, q).
Obviously, it is true that U b(A′) ≥ U b(∅). For every {c} ∈ γb(p, q) such that µ(c) = pτ(c),
it holds that {(τ(c), p′τ(c))} ∈ γb(p′, q), so ub(c) ≤ ub(τ(c), p′τ(c)) ≤ U b(A′). For every {c} ∈
γb(p, q) such that µ(c) = p′τ(c), it holds that {c} ∈ γb(p′, q), so ub(c) ≤ U b(A′). Thus
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Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds for every b ∈ B1.
Let some b ∈ B2 ∪ B3 be given. It holds that Ab = Ab. If Ab = ∅, then we clearly have
Ab ∈ γb(p, q). Otherwise, let (t,m) ∈ Y be such that Ab = {(t,m)}. Since b is matched with
some agent σ(t) ∈ S2 ∪ S3 and by Uσ(t)(A′) ≤ Uσ(t)(A), it holds that p′t ≤ pt = pt. From
Ab ∈ γb(p, q) it now follows that Ab ∈ γb(p, q). Obviously, it is true that U b(A) ≥ U b(∅). For
every {c} ∈ γb(p, q) such that µ(c) = pτ(c), it holds that {c} ∈ γb(p, q), so ub(c) ≤ U b(A).
For every {c} ∈ γb(p, q) such that µ(c) = p′τ(c), it holds that {(τ(c), pτ(c))} ∈ γb(p, q),
so ub(c) ≤ ub(τ(c), pτ(c)) ≤ U b(A). Thus Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds for every
b ∈ B2 ∪B3.
Step 2: Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds.
Let some s ∈ S1 be given. By the first part of the proof it holds that there is t ∈ τ(A)
such that σ(t) = s and β(t) ∈ B1, so U b(A) > U b(A′). We have that As = (A′)s. Moreover,
from U s(A′) > U s(A), it follows that pt < p′t = pt, so (A
′)s ∈ γs(p). Obviously, it is
true that U s(A′) ≥ U s(∅). For every {c} ∈ γs(p) such that µ(c) = pτ(c) it holds that
{c} ∈ γs(p), so us(c) ≤ U s(A) < U s(A′). For every {c} ∈ γs(p) such that µ(c) = p′τ(c) it
holds that {c} ∈ γs(p′), so us(c) ≤ U s(A′). It follows that Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1
holds for every s ∈ S1.
Let some s ∈ S2 ∪ S3 be given. By the first part of the proof it holds that As = As. If
As = ∅, then clearly As ∈ γs(p). Otherwise, there is (t,m) ∈ Y such that As = {(t,m)}.
From U s(A) ≥ U s(A′), it follows that p′t ≤ pt = pt, so As ∈ γs(p). Obviously, it is true that
U s(A) ≥ U s(∅). For every {c} ∈ γs(p) such that µ(c) = pτ(c) it holds that {c} ∈ γs(p),
so us(c) ≤ U s(A). For every {c} ∈ γs(p) such that µ(c) = p′τ(c) it holds that {c} ∈ γs(p′),
so us(c) ≤ U s(A′) ≤ U s(A). It follows that Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds for every
s ∈ S2 ∪ S3.
Step 3: Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1 holds.
For each t ∈ T, if pt < lβ(t)t , then pt < lβ(t)t and p′t < lβ(t)t , so since (p, q, A) and (p′, q, A′)
are both QCCEs, it follows that qt = 0.
We conclude that (p, q, A) is a QCCE. Q.E.D.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 5.16
Since p′ ∈ P (E , q), then there is an outcome A such that (p′, q, A) is a QCCE. Let A′′
be defined as
A′′ = A ∨ A
= (∪b∈B{(A)b | U b(A) > U b(A)}) ∪ (∪b∈B{Ab | U b(A) < U b(A)})
∪ (∪b∈B{Ab | U b(A) = U b(A)}).
By Theorem 5.12, (p∨p′, q, A′′) is a QCCE. By the first part of the proof of Theorem 5.12,
for every agent i ∈ B ∪ S such that U i(A) > U i(A) or U i(A) < U i(A), agent i makes
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a trade with some other agent in both (p, q, A) and (p′, q, A), and so agent i also makes
a trade in (p ∨ p′, q, A′′). By the construction of A′′, the set of agents who choose the
no-trade option at (p, q, A) is the same as the set of agents who choose the no-trade option
at (p ∨ p′, q, A′′), i.e., B\β(τ(A)) = B\β(τ(A′′)) and S\σ(τ(A)) = S\σ(τ(A′′)).
Let A′ be defined as
A′ = A ∧ A′′
= (∪b∈B{(A)b | U b(A) > U b(A′′)}) ∪ (∪b∈B{(A′′)b | U b(A) < U b(A′′)})
∪ (∪b∈B{(A′′)b | U b(A) = U b(A′′)}).
By Theorem 5.12, ((p ∨ p′) ∧ p′, q, A′) is a QCCE. By the first part of the proof of The-
orem 5.12, for every agent i ∈ B ∪ S such that U i(A) > U i(A′′) or U i(A) < U i(A′′),
agent i makes a trade with some other agent in both (p ∨ p′, q, A′′) and (p′, q, A), and so
agent i also makes a trade in ((p ∨ p′) ∧ p′, q, A′). By the construction of A′, the set of
agents who choose the no-trade option at (p ∨ p′, q, A′′) is the same as the set of agents
who choose the no-trade option at ((p∨ p′)∧ p′, q, A′), i.e., B\β(τ(A′′)) = B\β(τ(A′)) and
S\σ(τ(A′′)) = S\σ(τ(A′)).
Thus B\β(τ(A)) = B\β(τ(A′)) and S\σ(τ(A)) = S\σ(τ(A′)). The result now follows
from the observation that (p ∨ p′) ∧ p′ = p′. Q.E.D.
A.11 Proof of Theorem 6.4
Let (p, q, A) be a DE of E . For every b ∈ B, δb(p, q) = δb(p, q), so from Condition (i)
of Definition 6.1, it follows that Ab ∈ δb(p, q), so Condition (i) of Definition 4.1 holds.
For every s ∈ S, δs(p) = δs(p), so from Condition (ii) of Definition 6.2, it follows that
As ∈ δs(p), so Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1 holds. Finally, for every t ∈ T such that
pt < l
β(t)
t , it holds that pt < pt, so by Condition (iv) of Definition 6.2, we have qt = 0 and
Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1 is satisfied. We have shown that (p, q, A) is a QCCE of E .
Q.E.D.
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